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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
ST!l.TE OF UTAH

DORIS C. RUCKER,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
vs.

Case No. 18991

DALE E. RUCKER,
Defendant-Appellant.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT
STATEMENT OF THE tlATURE OF THE CASE
This is an appeal from a judgment and decree and the adverse
ruling on Appellant's Motion to Set Aside Judgment,
Judicial District Court,

in the Fourth

in and for Utah County, the Honorable

George E. Ballif, presiding.

This appeal is pursuant to Rule 72

of the Utah Rules of Civil .Procedure.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
The court below entered a default judgment and decree of
divorce in the above-entitled matter on November 18,

1981.

Sub-

sequently, appellant and respondent, by and through their then
respective counsel, stipulated and agreed to set aside the default
judgment in certain particulars.

On December 23, 1982, the court

a decree awarding respondent child support and items of
rPa] and personal property.
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On January 5, 1983, appellant moved the court to set as,
the decree rendered on December 23,

1982,

which motion was

rl,,

on January 26, 1983.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Appellar:t seeks a reversal of the denial of his Motion to.
aside the default judgment and decree below and a remand tot·
lower court for a trial on the merits.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
On November 12, 1981, a hearing on a default proceeding in
divorce action brought by respondent against Plaintiff was helc ·
the Fourth Judicial District Court,
presiding.

The

court awarded

the Honorable George E. BalL

respondent

a

decree

of divorc,

consistent with the respondent's complaint (R.20,28-30).
Subsequently, respondent retained counsel and at that ti1°
counsel for appellant and counsel for respondent stipulated ar.:
agreed to set aside the default judgment with regard to certa;
particulars

(R.31).

Initially,

the court refused to sign

tr.

order based on the stipulation and agreement to set aside
default judgment and decree (R.32).
However,
counsel

for

on

Januray

respondent

Ballif's chambers.

26,

met

1982,counsel
in

informal

for

appellant ar..

conference

in

The court granted the stipulation with regar.

to the distribution of real and personal property, and ali;non·
but left intact the decree of divorce divorcing appellant '
respondent, awarding to respondent the custocy of the part:'
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minor child, and ordering appellant to pay child support for the
minor child in the amount of two hundred fifty dollars monthly
( F. 3 3) •

On November 12, 1982, counsel for appellant, Nick Colessides,
moved to withdraw as counsel, which motion was

The court

advised appellant to obtain the services of new counsel,

and

ordered the trial date of November 30, 1982 vacated, and reset the
trial for January 5,

1983 at 2:00 p.m.

sent appellant a letter,

(R.106) Mr. Collesides then

informing appellant of the trial date in

the divorce action, January 5, 1983 (R.122).
After Mr.

Colessides' withdrawal,

B. Watson about representing him.

appellant contacted Wayne

On or about December 29, 1982,

appellant received a letter from Mr. Watson informing him that Mr.
Watson would not be available to try the case on January 5, 1983,
and

also

informing appellant

investigation,

that

according

the date of January 5,

to

Mr.

1983 was a

Watson's

firm

trial

setting (R.123).
At no time did appellant receive any notice, either written
or oral, of a change in the trial date (R.121).
the lack of notice to appellants,

Notwithstanding

a trial in absentia was held on

December 22, 1982, and appellant received a copy of the findings
of fact and conclusions of law in thi,s case on or about December
30, 1983.

It was appellant's intention to appear in this matter

with counsel, and to defend his interests therein (R.121).
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That there was confusion over the date of the trial iri

1

matter is evident by the opening comments of the court on Dece·
22, 1982:
THE COURT:
The matter that's before the Court this
morning is Rucker vs. Rucker, Civil No. 58,308.
This matter was noticed for hearing this morning at 9:30 a.m.
A notice to that effect went out,
according to the certificate in the file to both
Richard L. Maxfield, Attorney at Law, Counsel for
Plaintiff and Dale E. Rucker, who is, at this
point, prose. His prior attorney withdrew. The
Court allowed him to withdraw.
Nick Colessides.
The Minutes entry says that the trial was re-set
for January 5th, 1983. Why do I see that?
MRS. CHAPPLE (Deputy Clerk): Well, it was set for
then.
But you were going to be on vacation that
week, so it was changed. (Tr.2)
Though

respondent

testified at trial

that appellant w:

informed of the trial date of December 22, 1982, and that appe:lant had stated to her that he would be in court on that dat;
such testimony was clearly without foundation

(R.121).

Appellant, on January S, 1983, moved the court to set a<"
the judgment and decree entered after the trial in absentia,
on

the

mistake,

fact

that his

failure

to

appear

at

trial

b2S'

was due

inadvertance, surprise or excusable neglect, and furthe

that he was prevented from appearing by the fraud,
sentation, or other misconduct of respondent (R.115).
was denied by the court (R.127).
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This mot: ..

.!\RGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN DENYING
APPELLANT'S MOTION TO SET ASIDE THE DEFAULT JUDGMENT
AND DECREE, WHERE APPELLANT'S FAiLURE TO APPEAR WAS
THE RESULT OF SURPRISE OR EXCUSABLE NEGLECT;
OR FRAUD
OR MISREPRESENTATION OF OTHER PARTY.

Rule

60 (b)

pertinent part,

Utah

Rules

of

Civil

Procedure,

provides

in

that:

On Motion and upon such terms as are just, the
court may in furtherance of justice relieve a party
or his legal representative from a final judgment,
order, or proceeding for the following reasons: (1)
mistake, inadvertance, surprise, or excusable
neglect; • • • (3) fraud (whether heretofore denominated intrinsic or extrinsic), misrepresentation,
or other misconduct of an adverse party; • • • or
(7) any other reason justifying relief from the
operation of the judgment.
Clearly,

under this rule,

the trial court should not act arbi-

trarily in denying a motion to set aside a default judgment, but
should be generally indulgent toward permitting full

inquiry and

knowledge of disputes so they can be settled in conformity with
law and

justice.

Mayhew y. Standard Gilsonite Co,,14 Utah 2d

52, 376 P.2d 941. Further, this court held in Mayhew. fil.lm it
is an abuse of discretion to refuse to vacate a default judgment
where there

is reasonable

justification or excuse for

the

defendant's failure to appear and timely application is made to
set aside.
aside

supporting its holding in Mavhew, ..s.J.!.l2.UL-•

setting

a definite judgment rendered in a trial court, this Court

stated that

7

It is undoubtedly correct that the trial cour!
is endowed with considerable latitude of discretion
in granting or denying such motions.
However, it ialso true that the court cannot act arbitrarily u
that regard, but should be generally indulgent
toward permitting full inquiry and knowledge of
disputes so they can be settled advisedly and in
conformity with law and justice,
To
clamp a
judgment rigidly and irrevocably on a party without
a hearing is obviously a harsh and oppressive thina.
It is fundamental in our system of justice that
party to a controversy should be afforded an
opportunity to present his side of the case. [376
P.2d at 952(footnotes omitted)]

In Central Finance Company y. Kynaston,
P.2d

316

(1969),

this

court

quoted

22
with

Utah 2d 284, L
approval

f"

Mayhew.supra., in reversing the refusal of the trial court to,,aside a default judgment where defense counsel, in his verifie
motion to set aside the default, attested that he had not recein
notice of trial.

Further,

this court also vacated a defau::

judgment in Interstate-Excav..ating y. Agla Development, 611
369 (1980).
receive

P.:

Io Interstate Excayating. 5Ju!_i;_a, appellant did nc

notice

of

trial

date

from

attorney's withdrawal from the case.

its

attorney

after::-

The appellant did,

howe'iE'

immediately upon receipt of notice of default judgment, contac
other counsel who thereafter proceeded with diligence to atta'.
the

default

judgments.

This

court

reasoned

that

under sc:

circumstances the interests of justice would be best servPri'
setting aside the default judgment.
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Surely,

then,

under the instant facts,

the default judgment

rendered by the court below should be vacated.
Appellant received letters from two

separate

attorneys, one

of whom had previously represented him in the divorce action in
the court below,

and one whom appellant had contacted about

representing him in the matter.

Both letters stated that trial in

the divorce action in the court below would be on January 5, 1983.
Appellant relied on this information, and intended to appear with
counsel on January 5, 1983 got trial, since he received no notice
of the change in trial date.

Once he received a copy of the

findings of fact and conclusions of law and decree in the matter
rendered after the default hearing of December 23, 1983 appellant
timely moved to set aside the judgment.
Therefore,

consistent

with

this

Court's

decisions,

appellant's mistake as to the date of the trial, based as it was
on statements from two competent and able attorneys as to the
trial date of January 5, 1983 being a firm date, was sufficient
cause for setting aside the judgment and decree in the court
below.

The summary denial by the above court to set aside the

judgment and decree was an abuse of discretion by that court.
In
411

P.2d 129

y, Mountain View Memorial Estates,

(1966),

this Court,

17 Utah 2d 323,

in setting aside a default

judgment and remanding the case for trial on the merits, described
the policy behind liberal application of procedural rules allowing
fer vacation of default judgments in holding that:
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The object to be desired in this as in all cases
the searching out of the truth and doing justice
between the parties in regard to the
between them.
To carry out that purpose it is
policy of the law to favor a trial on the merits and
to afford both sides a full opportunity to present
their evidence and contentions as to disputed issues
so they may be disposed of on substantial rather than
upon technical grounds.
Accordingly courts should
exercise caution in regard to default judgments and
should be somewhat indulgent in setting them aside.
In Helgesen v.

Inyangum.i.£, 636 P.2d 1079 (Utah, 1981), tr..

court held that the trial court abused its discretion in refusi;
to set aside a default judgment,

reasoning that:

The decision to relieve a party from a final
judgment under rule 60 (b) (1) is subject to the
discretion of the trial court.
But discretion
should be exercised in furtherance of justice and
should incline towards granting relief in a
doubtful case to the end that the party may have a
hearing.
Y... D_.ix.Qn fu1.D..Q.h 1:..Q.., 12 3 Utah 416,
260 P.2d 741 (1953).
[636 P.2d at 1081]
636 P.2d at 1081.
Further,

46 Arn. Jur. 2d, Judgments.

in .Mendenhall y. Kingston,

610

P.2d 1287 (Otar

1980) this Court noted with approval the effect of Rule 60(b)
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure:
There is no doubt about the salutary purposes of
Rule 60 (b) to redress any injustices that may have
resulted because of excusable neglect, or the
wrongs of an opposing party.
Nor that Rule 60(bl
should be liberally construed to effectuate that
purpose.
[610 P.2d at 1289.]
While this Court has noted that this rule should be libenL
applied,

it has also held that for the trial court's refusal

vacate a valid

judgment to be an abuse of discreti0n,

pub

policy demands more than a mere statement the movant did not h3
his day in court.

Public policy demands that the movant show t''
10

he has used due diligence and that he was prevented from appearing
by circumstances beyond his control.

Children y, Nulffenstein.
instant matter,

560

P.2d

331

(Utah,

appellant has met this burden,

to appear in court on December 22,
excusable

State in interest of

mistake

of

believing

1977).

In

the

since his failure

1982 was due to his honest and
the

erroneous

information

he

received from two well-respected and well-qualified attorneys.
This

Court

proposition,

has

also

determined

that,

as

a

general

one who seeks to vacate a default judgment must

proffer some defense of at least sufficient ostensible merit as
would justify a trial of the issue thus raised.
L.-.Major-Blakeney Corooration.545 P.2d 507
trial courts,

Downey State Bank
(Utah,

1976).

in the default judgment and decree,

The

awarded to

respondent all of the properties formerly owned by appellant and
respondent during

their marriage.

Certainly,

were appellant

allowed to proceed on the merits, his interests would be better
defended, and there is a substantial probability that appellant
would be awarded more than merely his automobiles, mechanic tools,
retirement income, and personal effects and belongings.
Not only would appellant's interests be better protected in a
trial on the merits, but in addition, respondent would suffer no
prejudice

thereby.

Respondent

would

be

able

to

put

on

her

evidence in an adversarial proceeding, and the matter would be
determined in conformity with law and justice.
under

facts

Supreme court,

similar

to

those

at

issue here,

the Oregon

in Hanthorn y. Oliver, 51 P. 440 (Ore., 1897) set
11

as id e a default j u d gm en t

0

n g r 0 unds

0

f ex cu s ab 1 e m i st a k e

honest misunderstanding by the defendant.

an ci

In Hanthorn. fill.£..L'i,

defendant was informed by his counsel on Monday the case
for Tuesday,
intended,

and, believing that Tuesday of the next week

he attended at that time, and then,

for the first tp;

found that judgment had gone against him by default.
Other

jurisdictions

also

consistently

regard

acciden·

surprise, or unavoidable casualty or misfortune as a sufficic··
ground to vacate a judgment.

The New Mexico Supreme Court,

Sp r i n g e r C o r po r a t i

5l O P. 2d

1 O7 2

( N• M• ,

1 97'

determined that "because courts universally favor trial on t;.'
merits,

slight abuse of discretion in refusing to set aside,

defult judgment will often be sufficient to justify reversal
the order," 510 P.2d at 1074, and that the trial court must app'·
a liberal standard in determining
neglect and

(2)

(1)

whether there is excusati'

whether the defendants have a

meritorio,;•

defense.
In Schulman y. Bongberg-Whitney Electric. Inc.,

645

P.2d f.

(Nev., 1982) the Nevada Supreme Court held that the decision

t

grant or deny a motion to set aside a default judgment rests w1:
the sound discretion of the trial court, and that such oecis·
must not be arbitrary or cavalier but must be exercised witr
guidelines established by the State Supreme Court.

One of ti1ci

guidelines is that cases should be heard on the merits whene.·
possible.
Appellant

submits

that
12

since

his

complete

reliance ·

erroneous information provided

him by two respected attorneys as

to the date of his trial is reasonable justification or excuse for
his failure to appear at trial on December 22, 1983, the trial
court abused its discretion in denying his motion to set aside the
default

judgment and decree rendered after the trial held in

Appellant's absence.
In the alternative, appellant submits that his failure to
appear at the trial on December 22, 1982 was due to the fraud, or
misrepresentation of respondent.

Respondent testified at the

trial held in appellant's absence that appellant was informed of
the December 22, 1982 trial date, and the appellant had stated to
her that he would be in court on that date.

Appellant, however,

has by affidavit sworn that such statements are entirely without
foundation.
The only evidence as to appellant's knowledge of the date
scheduled for the trial of this matter in the lower court other
than the statements of appellant and respondent are the letters of
Mr. Colessides and Mr. Watson to appellant, indicating that the
date

of trial

was

to be January 5,

1983 at 2:00 p.m.

Of

particular importance is the fact that the letter from Mr. Watson
is dated December 27, 1982, five days after the trial in absentia
was held and only nine days before January 5, 1983.

Mr. Watson,

in his letter, stated that he checked the date of trial, and found
that January 5, 1983 was a firm setting.
Respondent's testimony that appellant knew of the change in
trial date is suspect, at very least, given both appellant's sworn
13

statement that he had no such knowledge,
counsel that the January date was a
At the very least,

and the letters,,

cate.

given the liberal policy of this Cour

setting aside default judgments where one party has not t
allowed a hearing, appellant should be given the benefit oft.
doubt here.
knowledge

Respondent's self-serving testimony as to appellanc
of

the

change

in

trial

date

is

uncorroborate'

Appellant's sworn statement that he had no knowledge of the chanc'
is corroborated by two letters from competent attorneys.
Appellant submits that,
respondent misled

the

lower

given the strong possibilities th2·
court and/or

appellant to avo;:

confrontation at trial, this court should set aside the defau::
judgment and decree rendered in the lower court.
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CONCLUSION
Since appellant's failure to appear at the trial held in his
0

osence on December 2 2, 19 82

is justifiable and was completely

based on circumstances beyond his control, the denial by the trial
court of appellant's motion to set aside the default judgment was
an abuse of discretion.

In the alternative appellant prays for

relief based on the fraud or misrepresentation of respondent.
For these reasons, appellant prays that this Court reverse
the judgment below and remand the matter to the trial court for a
trial on the merits.

/
I
I
'
Vernon F. Romney,/
Attorneys for Appellant
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Mailed 2 copies of

the foregoing Brief of

Appellant
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